Recent Case: Criminal Law - Appellate Review of Federal Sentences [\u3ci\u3e United States v. Daniels\u3c/i\u3e, _ _ F.2d _ _ (6th Cir. 1971)] by , Case Western Reserve University Law Review
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 2
1972
Recent Case: Criminal Law - Appellate Review of
Federal Sentences [ United States v. Daniels, _ _ F.2d
_ _ (6th Cir. 1971)]
Case Western Reserve University Law Review
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Case Western Reserve University Law Review, Recent Case: Criminal Law - Appellate Review of Federal Sentences [ United States v.
Daniels, _ _ F.2d _ _ (6th Cir. 1971)], 23 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 430 (1972)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol23/iss2/10
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:430
CRIMINAL LAW - APPELLATE REVIEW OF
FEDERAL SENTENCES
United States v. Daniels,
446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971)
"If there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which is
firmly established, it is that the appellate court has no control over
a sentence which is within the limits allowed by a statute."' This
appellate court rule against review of sentences,2 upheld by 80 years
of precedent in all 11 circuits,3 has given trial courts virtually ex-
clusive control over the duration and severity of sentences within
statutory maximums. Forbidden to review4 the actual sentence
chosen, the appellate court has been limited to reviewing the sen-
tencing process which preceded that choice.5 This limitation has
been challenged recently by a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sion, United States v. Daniels,6 where a specific change in a sentence
1 Gurara v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930).
2 The rule against appellate review of sentencing has its origins in appellate holdings
that the power to review sentences was removed by Congress in the 1891 Act transferring
the jurisdiction of the circuits to the courts of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970). This
act omits mention of the power of appellate review previously authorized by the Act
of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, § 1, 20 Star. 354. See, e.g., Freeman v. United States, 243
F. 353 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 600 (1919). Though the non-review-
ability rule has never been specifically upheld by the Supreme Court, that Court has
supported the rule in dictum. See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958);
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932).
3 E.g., United States v. Bradley, 421 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1970); O'Brien v. United
States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cit. 1967); Zaffarano v. Blackwell, 383 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.
1967); Heath v. United States, 375 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1967); Weissman v. United
States, 387 F.2d 271 (10th Cir. 1967); Ruiz v. United States, 365 F.2d 500 (3d Cir.
1966); Bowman v. United States, 350 F.2d 913 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950
(1965); Jones v. United States, 327 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cit. 1963); United States v. Soh-
nen, 280 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Kapsalis, 214 F.2d 677 (7th Cir.
1954); Tincher v. United States, 11 F.2d 18 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 664
(1926).
4 As used here, "review" means an appellate examination of the sentence itself, fol-
lowed by instruction for correction or change.
5 See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1969), where the
court stated:
[W]e do not find it necessary to combat the massed precedent forbidding
appellate modification of sentences. The objections raised center not upon
the "duration or severity of this sentence," but upon the reasons for which it
was imposed .... [TJhe appellate court must scrutinize the sentencing process
to insure that the trial judge has considered the information available with
some regard for its reliability, and has evaluated the information in light of
the factors relevant to sentencing (foomotes omitted).
6446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971).
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was ordered after a trial court had refused to reconsider the severity
of the sentence on remand.
The appellant, Daniels, was a religious conscientious objector
who disobeyed the orders of his local draft board to appear before
it to receive instructions on alternative civilian service. The Govern-
ment instituted prosecution for his failure to appear and District
Judge Swinford sentenced Daniels to the statutory maximum five
year prison term,7 despite assurances that Daniels would willingly
perform alternative service if ordered to do so by the court.8  In his
first appeal, Daniels' conviction was affirmed,9 but the appellate court
remanded the case to allow the trial judge to reconsider the sen-
tence, which it described as unduly severe and out of line with sen-
tences being imposed for similar offenses by other courts in the cir-
cuit.10
On remand, Judge Swinford refused to modify the sentence,
commenting in court that "'the offense strikes at the very foundation
and fundamentals of our whole governmental system,'" and that he
had always given five year sentences to defendants convicted of dis-
obeying a draft board." He further proclaimed that "[i3t is estab-
lished law in this circuit without exception that the matter of sen-
tencing addresses itself entirely to the trial judge."'"
On Daniels' second appeal, the court rejected this notion that
the sentence is totally immune from appellate review and held that
Judge Swinford had failed to properly exercise his duty of imposing
sentence. It remanded the case with instructions that the sentence
be suspended and that Daniels be placed on probation, conditional
upon his performing alternative service.
The significance and meaning of this appellate action depends
on whether it is the product of a review of excessive sentence sever-
7 United States v. Daniels, Crim. No. 10-703 (E.D. Ky., Sept. 29, 1969).
8446 F.2d at 969 n.3 (6th Cir. 1971). A Jehovah's Witness, Daniels viewed the
draft board as an arm of the military, and, as such, his religion prohibited him from
obeying any order emanating from it. But he was willing to obey a court order pertain-
ing to alternative service since he did not consider the court an element of the military.
9 United States v. Daniels, 429 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1971). The appellate court
remanded the case to allow the defendant to file a motion under FED. R. CRUM. P. 35.
This would permit review of the sentence so that Judge Swinford could consider the
appellate court's suggestion that sentence be suspended and that probation be granted
conditional to Daniels' performing the alternative service he had refused to perform
under the orders of his draft board. 429 F.2d at 1274.
10 429 F.2d at 1274.
" These statements do not appear in Judge Swinford's opinions. They are repro-
duced in the second appellate opinion. 446 F.2d at 969.
12 United States v. Daniels, 319 F. Supp. 1061, 1062 (D. Ky. 1970).
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ity, or merely of improper sentencing process. Because of the non-
reviewability rule, appellate control of sentence severity has been
limited to a remand with suggestions, rather than instructions, that
punishment be lessened.13 The appellate right to review sentencing
procedure, on the other hand, has been held to include the power
to remand with orders to correct the process and resentence accord-
ingly. This power to review the sentencing procedure can be in-
voked where the trial court included something prohibited14 or ex-
cluded something vital'" in determining sentence. Several explana-
tions of the nature of the review conducted by the appellate court in
Daniels are possible.
Judge Celebrezze, writing for a unanimous court, apparently be-
lieved that the court merely reviewed whether the trial judge had
taken into consideration the appropriate factors in fixing the sen-
tence. His opinion made no mention of a right to review sentence
severity, and instead, citing Scott v. United States,16 focused on the
right to review the sentencing process. In Scott the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals, differentiating between review of
sentence severity and review of the reasons for which the sentence
was imposed, held that the appellate court must "scrutinize the sen-
tencing process to insure that the trial judge ...has evaluated the
available information in light of factors relevant to sentencing.'
17
It is Judge Swinford's omission of relevant sentencing consider-
ations that the court objected to in Daniels. In the past, appellate
courts have disturbed lower court sentences when the trial judge
has relied on factors precluded from consideration by the Constitu-
tion,' 8 or has failed to consider factors made relevant either by stat-
ute'9 or by the Supreme Court.2° In finding Judge Swinford in
13 See, e.g., United States v. Moody, 371 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v.
West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966).
14 See Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967) (increasing original
sentence on retrial in light of new testimony held improper).
15 See Leach v. United States, 334 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (refusal of defendant's
request for a psychiatric examination permitted by statute held improper).
16 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
17 Id. at 266.
18 See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (sentencing, after guilty plea, in
absence of counsel and on basis of erroneous information concerning prior convictions
held to violate due process).
19 See Leach v. United States, 334 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
20 In Briscoe v. United States, 391 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court remanded
for resentencing upon a finding that the trial judge had refused to consider rehabilita-
tion in determining the sentence. Like the court in Daniels, the Briscoe opinion also
relied on the Supreme Court dictum in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248
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error, the Daniels opinion relied on Supreme Court dictum prais-
ing "individualized sentencing"'" and advocating that the trial court
"consider all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the
crime." 22
The appellate court clearly concluded that this dictum went un-
heeded by the lower court; but less clear is how Judge Celebrezze
arrived at this determination. On the one hand, it is possible the
court believed that Judge Swinford's inflexibility (in always giv-
ing the statutory maximum prison term to selective service violators)
was per se improper sentencing procedure. The fact that the crime
involved the draft was apparently the sole factor considered by Judge
Swinford when sentence was imposed. Such an interpretation would
leave Daniels largely limited to its peculiar facts and applicable only
where a trial judge has actually avowed, or perhaps clearly demon-
strated, such a completely mechanical approach to sentencing.
On the other hand, it is possible the court believed that Dan-
iels' sentence itself revealed procedural error under the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case. The court admitted that its first "remand
order was based in large part on the peculiar facts of the ... case,"25
and it specifically considered these facts in finding that Judge Swin-
ford had failed to utilize the modern penological philosophy that
was praised by the Supreme Court. The appellate court determined
that considerations of reform, protection of society, discipline and
deterrence did not necessitate imprisonment of a young man of "good
character" and "model behavior" who "devoutly adhered to his re-
ligious beliefs without impeding the rights of others."2' 4
Under this interpretation, the court contrasted the sentence im-
posed with the totality of appropriate facts and inferred that the
trial court excluded essential considerations from the sentencing pro-
cess. A forbidden review of sentence severity would involve a sim-
ilar contrast, differing from this approach only in its inference that
essential sentencing considerations - although taken into account
by the trial court - were improperly weighed. But this distinction,
while perhaps logical, is impractical and involves little more than a
(1949) that "[rjeformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important
goals of criminal jurisprudence."
21Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
2 2 Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959).
2 446 F.2d at 968. The court was referring to the facts surrounding the defen-
dant's refusal to obey his draft board.
24 Id. at 972.
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difference in label. In a given case, it would be extremely difficult
to distinguish the one kind of review from the other.
If either of these interpretations is correct and the court was
dealing with the sentencing process alone, it is still difficult to ac-
count for the appellate court's assuming the responsibility of impos-
ing sentence. No precedent exists for an appellate court's substitut-
ing a new sentence upon a finding of an error in the sentencing
process, at least absent facts that would make the error uncorrect-
able by the normal remand. And Daniels does not present a factual
situation similar to either appellate case that has predicated its ac-
tion on the grounds of an uncorrectable error.25  However, the
court's action in Daniels might be justified by an extension of the
rationale of those cases. Because any procedural error in sentencing
Daniels was tied to Judge Swinford's apparent refusal to consider
all the factors appropriate to sentencing, it is reasonable to conclude
that he would not have correctly discharged his duty under a tradi-
tional remand for process correction. In this sense, the error could
be considered uncorrectable by a remand and the appellate court's
action could be considered the only reasonable one.
But it is not clear that Daniels was limited to a review of the
sentencing process. It is possible that the court was in fact review-
ing the sentence itself. The first remand, rather than looking to
errors in the sentencing process, suggested that Judge Swinford
reconsider the severity of the sentence. If the appellate court's ac-
tion on the second appeal was directed at a review of sentence sever-
ity, the opinion suffers from a lack of support. In justifying the
court's action, Judge Celebrezze relied largely on Yates v. United
States.26 In Yates the Supreme Court changed a contempt sentence
after similar lower court recalcitrance. But Yates is not applicable
to the situation in Daniels. The authority of the Supreme Court
to review the sentence in Yates was based on the exceptional nature
of contempt sentences. Since penalties for contempt are not fixed by
statute and the usual safeguards against abuse are absent, the Su-
25 In Coleman v. United States, 357 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and Frady v. United
States, 348 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 909 (1965), the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals commuted death penalties to life imprisonment, the
only alternative allowed by law, upon a showing that the trial court committed errors in
their sentencing procedures. In both cases the error was not correctable through a re-
mand. In Frady, the jury had been improperly instructed and polled, but could not be
reassembled for further proceedings. In Coleman, the original trial judge had died and,
of course, could not reexercise his sentencing discretion upon a remand.
26 356 U.S. 363 (1958).
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preme Court created an exception to the non-reviewability rule."
The Court's action in changing the sentence, rather than following
the normal procedure of allowing the trial court to do the resen-
tencing, was an exercise of supervisory power over a stubborn dis-
trict court which had already ignored proper instructions to reduce
the sentence. But Daniels' sentence was limited by statute and in-
volved no recognized exception to the non-reviewability rule. Thus,
despite Judge Swinford's recalcitrance, Daniels provides no occasion
for invoking the Yates rationale.
The only other example of an appellate review of a sentence
properly within statutory limits is United States v. Wiley.28 The
court in Wiley interpreted the supervisory power exercised in Yates
as encompassing the power to review and vacate sentences.2 9 How-
ever, this case has been criticized as based on a misinterpretation of
Yates. 0 Unlike the court in Wiley, the Supreme Court in Yates al-
ready had the power of sentence review under the contempt excep-
tion and simply exercised its supervisory power as an aid to its rec-
ognized appellate jurisdiction. But sentence review was beyond the
jurisdiction of the Wiley court. Supervisory power, as an aid to exist-
ing jurisdiction, could hardly be invoked to justify an action beyond
the court's jurisdiction, and Wiley has since been distinguished as
allowing review of sentences only under "exceptional circum-
stances."'1  The court cited no such circumstances in Daniels.
Specifically cited in Daniels, however, was an abuse of discretion
in the trial court's failure to choose an appropriate sentence. 2
Though there are no other cases holding such abuse permits a change
in the sentence, there is dictum indicating the appellate court has a
right to review a trial court's choice of sentence where the trial
court has abused sound discretion.3" Although it found the neces-
sary abuse, the court in Daniels made no mention of this dictum.
27 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 533, at 451 (1969).
28278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960).
29 Wiley held this supervisory power could be invoked in exceptional circumstances.
In Wiey, the trial judge had arbitrarily singled out one of the lesser defendants for
harsher punishment than his codefendants and the court of appeals held these facts con-
stituted such exceptional circumstances.
S0See 109 U. PA. L. REv. 422, 426 (1961); 75 HARv. L. REv. 416,417 (1961).
31 United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764, 766 (4th Cir. 1964). No such circum-
stances have since been encountered.
32446 F.2d at 972.
83 See, e.g., United States v. King, 420 F.2d 946, 947 (4th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Livers, 185 F.2d 807, 809 (6th Cir. 1950).
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Yet, if Daniels is to be interpreted as a review of sentence severity,
it effectively transformed this dictum into an explicit holding.
Does Daniels then stand for the proposition that an appellate
court's review power automatically includes the right to change a
sentence upon finding that it is a product of abused trial court dis-
cretion? Arguably it does not. It is possible that the review power
normally entails only the power to vacate and remand for resen-
tencing in the trial court. The change in sentence executed by the
Daniels court could then be explained as an exercise of an appellate
supervisory power similar to that in Yates. In Yates, the Supreme
Court said that any change of sentence should normally be done by
the trial court on remand. Only where the trial judge had already
ignored the "intimations" of the appellate court in an earlier remand
was it proper for the appellate court to impose its own sentence.
Actual appellate change of a sentence would remain an aberration
occurring only when a trial judge has ignored specific directions
from a higher court, as in Yates and Daniels.
If the Sixth Circuit's action in Daniels is interpreted and followed
in subsequent cases as precedent for appellate review of sentence
severity, the case may go a long way toward answering the concerns
raised by jurists such as Simon Sobeloff,3 4 who has long advocated
abandonment of the non-reviewability rule. Central to Celebrezze's
opinion is Sobeloff's notion that, "when the same crime is committed
under identical circumstances, the punishment should be reasonably
uniform."'
Answered as well is Sobeloff's concern that appellate courts
sometimes reverse convictions on "technical absurdities" merely be-
cause they lack power to deal with unjust sentences.36 Daniels
would establish an internal means for the judiciary to correct its own
mistakes, thus cutting down the necessity for executive clemency.3 7
Establishment of appellate review of inappropriately severe sen-
tences might also enhance public respect for the law and the admin-
istration of justice.3
34 See Sobeloff, A Recommendation for Appellate Review of Criminal Sentences, 21
BROOKLYN L. REV. 2 (1955).
35 Id. at 8. See 446 F.2d at 969.
36 Sobeloff, supra note 34, at 8.
7id. at 9.
38 Id.
